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Abstract: We draw on empirical results from three case studies of property rights 
change across forest and fisheries ecosystems in central Vietnam to investigate 
the circumstances under which collective property rights may make sense. A 
generic property rights framework was used to examine the bundles of rights 
and associated rights holders in each case, and to assess these arrangements with 
regard to their contextual fit, legitimacy and enforceability. The cases illustrate the 
interactions between private and collective rights to lands and resources, and the 
trade-offs inherent with different mixes of rights.
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1. Introduction
Responding to the challenges of rural poverty and environmental sustainability 
requires a flexible mix of individual and collective property rights. Resource-
based activities shift, depending upon, among other things, household needs, local 
ecologies and market opportunities. For these reasons, conventional categorization 
or advocacy of private, collective or public rights rarely account for the complex 
realities found in particular places (Barry and Meinzen-Dick 2008; German and 
Keeler 2010). Many property rights arrangements tend to enclose specific areas 
or reduce some people’s access to specific goods. Overlapping but differentiated 
‘bundles of rights’ (Schlager and Ostrom 1992) and hybrid property regimes can 
offer a more effective lens for understanding property rights complexity. In the 
context of a mixed public-private or collective rights situation, such bundles of 
rights may be related to access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation 
of resources, or parts of a resource, through time and space (Barry and Meinzen-
Dick 2008). Farmers or fishers may advocate for part of a bundle of rights 
(extraction, for example) with other rights residing with the collective or the state 
(management or alienation, as an example). Sensitivity to circumstance or context 
reveals that individual, collective and public property rights each have merits 
(Evans et al. 2010). The challenge for the resource manager, donor or policy-
maker is to ‘read’ when and where different rights regimes may be appropriate to 
support poverty alleviation and sustainable rural livelihoods more generally.
Property rights in Vietnam make for an interesting case. Vietnam has moved 
from forms of collectivization and state ownership that began in the late 1950s 
to an ambitious ‘renovation’ program leading to individual land titling in the 
late 1980s (Do and Iyer 2008). The Doi Moi period (or ‘renovation’) aimed to 
transform a centralized, state-planned economic system into a more decentralized, 
market-oriented system whereby the private sector would become the main engine 
of growth1. One aspect of these reform policies was to devolve authority over 
1 Key elements of this reform included land and agricultural reforms, an overhaul of the public sec-
tor and state owned enterprises, and the opening of the economy to international trade and foreign 
direct investment. Rapid growth followed: between 1994 and 2007 the annual average growth rate 
of GDP was just over seven percent (HDR 2009). Meanwhile, poverty levels did decrease (Vietnam 
ranks 55th among 135 countries for which the Human Poverty Index has been calculated) the govern-
ment pursued an active job creation strategy and emphasized social policies such as education and 
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production decisions to farmers and enterprises, and to establish property rights 
(for agricultural land and in some cases for individual households to manage 
forest areas) to encourage investment and provide a form of collateral for rural 
dwellers (Sunderlin et al. 2008). The majority of Vietnam’s 90 million people 
have access to small amounts of land (1–2 ha), particularly in rural, agriculture-
focused areas (where 72% of the population lives) (HDR 2009). Policy reforms in 
the 2000s (e.g. changes to the 2003 Land Law and Fisheries Law) recognized the 
role for collective rights, once again, to manage forest areas and fishing grounds. 
However, in the context of increasing privatization of land and marketization of 
rural production, the contextual fit, legitimacy and enforceability of collective 
rights has been uncertain.
Drawing on empirical results from three case studies of property rights 
change across forest and fisheries ecosystems in central Vietnam, we investigate 
the circumstances whereby collective property rights may make sense. 
Specifically, we seek to (i) understand the complex bundles of rights that exist 
across upland and lagoon ecosystems and the implications for livelihoods and 
environmental sustainability; (ii) examine the circumstances in which individuals 
and local institutions may seek to organize both for individual and collective 
property rights; and (iii) to reflect on the fit (social, ecological), enforceability 
and legitimacy of these collective rights arrangements. Insights from the cases 
highlight how the needs and aspirations of individuals and households do not 
easily conform to conventional property rights narratives (private vs. collective) 
or the implementation of policy prescriptions that emerge from these narratives. 
Results of the analysis contribute to common property theory by showing how 
local actors may choose to collectively manage and use natural resources (forest 
lands and aquatic resources in this case) as part of a broader strategy to obtain 
individual bundles of rights (which may include access, withdrawal, management, 
exclusion and alienation of resources, or parts of a resource) within the context of 
a collective rights policy framework.
2. Understanding property rights and the Vietnamese context
Property relations exist in multiple forms, and include laws, regulations, 
cultural norms, social values, social relationships or property practices. These 
arrangements are legitimized in the sense that the state or some other form of 
politico-legal authority (e.g. customary) sanctions them (Sikor and Lund 2009). 
Property rights define or delimit the range of privileges granted to individuals 
health care (HDI 2009). Agriculture remains an important source of employment and continues to 
contribute to Vietnam’s economic growth (25% in 2000 compared with 21% in 2009) (VNB 2010). 
Export commodities include agricultural products such as rice, coffee, rubber, pepper, cashew nuts, 
and tea along with natural resources such as oil and marine products (VBN 2010). Market institutions 
are firmly established in rural Vietnam, although the state intervenes actively in land markets, sup-
plies many inputs in agricultural production and plays a large role in many organizational activities 
(Markussen et al. 2010).
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or collective entities regarding specific assets or resources (Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi 2008; Mascia and Claus 2009). Rights to property (land, a set forest, 
individual trees, or a fishery area) may be held by an individual, shared by a 
group, or held collectively by multiple groups, and may be granted to user 
groups, villages, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. 
While private property is something that all households aspire to gain access to, 
particularly in resource-dependent areas, there is also a role for collective rights, 
and a significant body of scholarship (Ostrom 1990) that offers evidence of its 
historical and current importance. 
Commons scholars follow from the extensive research done by Ostrom (c.f., 
Ostrom 1990, 2009; Ostrom et al. 1999) and others to illustrate the potential 
of collective rights. Commons research has shown how community groups 
are capable of managing resources given certain conditions and appropriate 
incentives. There are numerous cases of commons governance (c.f., the database 
held at Indiana University), with research demonstrating how community forestry 
or fisheries can work both for natural resource conservation and, in certain cases, 
to produce local economic benefits (c.f., Barsimantov et al. 2011 for a review). 
Management may happen without government support, in cases of high capacity 
or relative isolation, although increasingly it is recognized that government 
involvement is an essential component of commons management (Khumsri et al. 
2008). The characteristics of a resource, levels of trust among actors, and rules in 
use also play an important role (Berge and van Laerhoven 2011). Most examples 
of common pool governance are small-scale and single-case. Yet from a policy 
perspective, linkages between tenure arrangements and tropical forest or fisheries 
conservation has become increasingly important as countries look to devolve 
forest and fisheries resources to local communities as a means of conserving 
forests and producing local economic benefits. Market-based conservation in 
collectively managed areas is also being applied, to varying degrees of success 
(c.f., Ricketts et al. 2004; McCauley 2006). Recent scholarship also illustrates 
how economic inequality can have a negative effect on resource governance 
outcomes (c.f., Andersson and Agrawal 2011). 
Common property management does have its challenges. For example, it 
can be part of a general off-loading of responsibility to lower management units 
(see Berkes 2010). This type of management arrangement becomes particularly 
challenging where resources are transboundary and in areas with high poverty 
rates (Cox 2008). Even with a plethora of new policy supporting commons 
management and collective rights arrangements, getting the right fit between 
collective goods (conservation) and individual benefits (livelihoods) remains 
problematic (Marschke 2012). Much of the common property and collective-
action literature has focused on the characteristics of the user group and attributes 
of the resources (Agrawal 2007). Thus, there is a need to consider the role of 
external influences, including the role of market drivers on tenure regimes and the 
costs of collective action (Barismantov et al. 2011), along with a need to draw on 
political economy processes to consider the social and political context in which 
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communities operate (Clement 2010) to better understand when collective rights 
are a viable resource management option. 
The strengths and weaknesses of individual rights are also contested. Most 
formalization processes around property rights (the transfer of rights from the 
state or collective to an individual or legal individual) involves a consolidation 
of all bundles of rights in a single owner (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). The 
benefits of individual property rights are such that security will provide increased 
incentives for individuals to invest, allow use of titles as collateral, and facilitate 
market development (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). Where land grabbing 
is an issue, this may give households a measure of assurance. Individual rights 
may also improve productivity through easing access to credit, since land is an 
excellent form of collateral when borrowing money from the bank (Markussen 
2008). In socialist countries undergoing rapid transitions, land titling has led to 
increased food security, although crop variation may be an issue, depending upon 
state policies (Markussen et al. 2011). Improved transferability rights of land have 
also led to a significant increase in activity in both rental and sales markets. Such 
transactions have, on average, ensured that most farmers have ownership of small 
amounts of farm land (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). 
Evidence as to the benefits of private rights to land and natural resources is 
mixed. For example, experience from the past decades of land titling processes 
shows that a single policy to achieve an exclusive outcome does not always work: 
restrictive land ownership and transfer policies have been shown to limit poorer 
people’s opportunities (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). Poverty typically 
involves a number of capability and entitlement deprivations that limit freedoms 
(Jentoft et al. 2010), and limited access to land that can result from exclusionary 
land titling is a basic deprivation. Another issue facing many commons users is 
a process of creeping enclosure which results from incremental and cumulative 
privatization events rather than a single regulatory moment (Murray et al. 2010). 
In other words, as commons areas become increasingly enclosed or territorialized, 
there are less common areas available for people to access (to fish, to collect 
non-forest timber products, to graze animals). Enclosure stems from multiple 
policies that restrict communal land access: protected areas, forest plantations 
or individual transfer quotas in the fisheries. Evidence shows such arrangements 
can achieve some form of economic efficiency and business flexibility, but also 
result in a loss of flexibility for resource users who depend upon shifting among 
resources (fish, wildlife, forest products) or access to transboundary resources. 
These unintended consequences are particularly painful for poorer households 
(Murray et al. 2010).
In Vietnam, tensions around individual and collective rights are a source 
of uncertainty for a wide range of rural actors (state and non-state). Gaining 
access to forestland and forest products, as an example, can be challenging for 
villagers, since the Vietnamese state owns and controls vast swaths of forestland 
(Sunderlin et al. 2008). While forest cover has increased as a result of large-scale 
afforestation efforts, this has not led to poverty alleviation in heavily forested 
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upland areas, particularly for ethnic minority villagers (Sunderlin and Ba 2005). 
Households do receive land title for agricultural land in and around the village, 
however, they cannot officially access forestlands unless participating in forest 
management programs whereby small forest blocks are allocated to households 
in exchange for protecting these plots from outside encroachment (Sikor and 
Nyuyen 2007; Clement 2010). Therefore, many claims are made in the informal 
realm since forest products2 fill income gaps and complement other forms of 
income (McElwee 2010; Turner Forthcoming). This can be risky, since villagers 
do not know when government officials might start enforcing official policies 
i.e. banning informal land and forest uses. Government policy is shifting to 
acknowledge these access challenges through recent reforms. As an example, the 
new Forestry Law (2005) recognizes the need to increase local access to forest 
resources, particularly in terms of enabling community forestry (a village-held 
collective right), and allocating private property rights to households in forest 
areas or former forest areas that were owned by the state.
Aquatic resources can also be challenging to access, albeit for different 
reasons. The pace of change along Vietnam’s coasts, deltas and lagoons has been 
intense, and has led to an enclosure of common spaces for fishing as aquaculture 
has intensified and coastal development has expanded generally3. This expansion 
of aquaculture ponds has brought a series of new pressures into coastal areas 
including higher competition for land and the threat of marginalizing rural 
communities from access to productive land and water resources (Bush et al. 
2009; Tuyen et al. 2010). Aquaculture farmers and capture fishers are drawing 
on the same resources, particularly since fish farmers have historically been 
dependent on wild caught fish to use as feed for their aquaculture farms (Bush 
et al. 2009). The natural resource base, particularly the inshore fisheries, has been 
severely overexploited, with many high value fish resources having significantly 
declined (Pomeroy et al. 2009; FAO 2010). Policy reform in this sector aims to 
better regulate fisheries and aquaculture growth. For example, the Ministry of 
Fisheries has created a series of master plans and issued decrees and ordinances 
aimed at the preservation of marine resources (Boonstra and Nyugen 2010). The 
new Fisheries Law (2003) also recognizes the role of community members in 
the management of their natural resources (Armitage et al. 2011). Provincial 
and District authorities have used the law to enact specific decisions enabling 
community forms of management and to formally transfer rights to village level 
associations. 
2 Recent studies illustrate the strong link between forest use and farming in Vietnam, with house-
holds relying on a diverse number of plant and animal species ranging from timber, charcoal, fuel 
wood, rattan, bamboo, fruit, plants for food and medicine, and forest animals (c.f., Sunderlin and Ba 
2005; McElwee 2010). 
3 Vietnam is now the third largest aquaculture producer in the world behind China and India; 
Vietnamese production has grown by 30.6% per annum as compared to the 6.1% per annum global 
growth of aquaculture (FAO 2010). 
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3. Approach, data collection and analysis
To understand where, if and when collective rights for natural resource management 
make sense, sensitivity to contextual variation and a diversity of property rights 
bundles is required. The analysis of cases in central Vietnam adapts a generic 
framework (c.f., Schlager and Ostrom 1992) in which rights categories (public, 
private, common), rights holders (state, individuals, corporations, groups), and 
rights bundles are emphasized (see Figure 1). Rights bundles overlap but include: 
1) use rights relating to access, withdrawal and exploitation; 2) control or decision-
making rights relating to management and exclusion; and 3) rights of ‘alienation’, 
such as those related to the right to rent (in whole or part), sell or transfer rights 
to others (Barry and Meinzen-Dick 2008; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008). The 
framework was used to organize data collection and analysis in three case study 
sites in central Vietnam to address the central question of when collective rights 
make sense, and to ‘read’ property rights regimes as they present themselves in 
complex social and ecological settings. 
No framework can address the confounding diversity of property rights 
regimes. However, a systematic examination of the holders of property rights and 
bundles of rights is helpful in mapping the reality facing resource users and policy-
makers. We use this framework as a descriptive tool, with which we are better 
able to examine the complexity of individual and collective rights. To facilitate 

































Figure 1: Property rights framework.
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arrangements with regard to their fit, legitimacy and enforceability (Ostrom et al. 
2002). Fit refers to the contextual appropriateness (social, economic, ecological) of 
the rights arrangement from the perspective of individual producers. This includes 
the fit of rules, rights and institutions with a) the social, cultural and economic 
practices of resource users, and b) the ecological characteristics of the resource 
system. For instance, the stationarity of forest resources or aquaculture outputs 
posses a different set of challenges than those associated with transboundary fish 
stocks. In both instances, the seasonality of access to resources (e.g. spawning 
periods, availability of non-timber forest products) further adds to the challenge 
of fit. Legitimacy involves both a material and subjective dimension, and thus, 
refers to the extent to which individuals (state and non-state) accept the rights 
arrangements as well as the actual codification or informal recognition of rights. 
Enforceability involves the pragmatic need for rights holders to protect their 
interests from others (non-local resource users) through monitoring and patrolling, 
and includes the ability of individual and community members themselves to 
enforce their rights, as well as the important role of formal authorities in securing 
rights arrangements. 
A multi-method and comparative case study approach was utilized in the 
context of a team project, “Governance and Management of Common Pool 
Resources in Vietnam4”. The core objective of this project was to identify when 
collective rights make sense to promote natural resource management and 
livelihood enhancement. We chose three specific rights allocation cases within 
Thua-Thien Hue province, central Vietnam to illustrate how collective rights 
may serve as a trigger for enhanced resource management and to consider the 
implications of such rights for resource governance (Figure 2): (1) community 
forestry across the upland forests; (2) state forest re-allocation vis-à-vis temporary 
use rights to a group of households in the upland forests; and (3) territorial use 
rights for fishers and aquaculturalists in Tam Giang Lagoon. The case studies 
were chosen to highlight different resource systems, although each case is situated 
in a similar context of shifting policies emphasizing decentralization and differing 
forms of rights allocation. The three empirical cases are illustrative of interactions 
between private and collective rights to land and natural resources, and the trade-
offs inherent with different mixes of rights. 
Case specific research questions and data collection were tailored for each 
site and examined how the different rights in the bundle shifted between various 
rights holders, and then addressed core issues of fit, enforceability and legitimacy. 
Data collection included semi-structured interviews, surveys (approx. 15% of 
households within six communes surveyed across the uplands and the lagoon), 
and participant observation (Table 1). The research builds on findings and data 
4 This project (2008–2011) was funded by Canada’s International Development Research Center 
(IDRC). The aim of the project is to better understand property rights to support better management 
of natural resources. Although reflecting upon the role the project team has played in helping to facili-
tate innovative rights arrangements is important, this is outside of the scope of this paper.
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from a series of investigations in the case study communities, other secondary 
literature and a review of specific resource governance arrangements (c.f., 
Tuyen et al. 2010a,b, 2011; Armitage et al. 2011; Huynh et al. 2011; Ngo et al. 
2011; Nguyen et al. 2011). The research also builds on more than a decade of 
experience within these areas, and during the more recent project period, extensive 
interaction. Results of the case analysis are provided in the following section.
Figure 2: Map of the study area.
Table 1: Research methods
Case Description of methods Time frame
Community forestry Literature review





State forest re-allocation Uplands survey (n=165)
Re-allocation survey (n=34)




Lagoon territorial use rights Lagoon survey (n=87)
Key informant interviews (n=42)
2009
2008–2011
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4. Results
4.1. Case one: community forestry
Community forestry in Vietnam emerged as a policy response to access 
challenges, and is meant to enable villagers to incorporate aspects of traditional 
rights and management systems, particularly in ethnic minority villages 
(Sunderlin and Ba 2005). This is an example of a collective management right 
that is allocated to the village level, enabling villages or groups of villages to 
enter into partnership with the State for the management of forest resources. 
This policy innovation is a departure from highly centralized forest policies that 
have characterized forestry management in Vietnam – a series of community 
forestry sites have now been established throughout Vietnam (Sunderlin and 
Ba 2005). A significant effort has gone into community forestry in the past 
number of years, with a number of international organizations supporting the 
designation and establishment of these sites (c.f. Ngo et al. 2011 for a review 
of international organizations working in uplands of Hue5). By the end of 2007, 
over 10,000 villages were managing over 2,700,000 ha of forest and bare-
land area, of which nearly 2,000,000 ha were community forests (Ngai 2009). 
The quality of such forest land allocation has been questioned (c.f., Sikor and 
Nuygen 2007; Ngo et al. 2011). 
Our first case draws insights from several community forestry sites within A. 
Loui District in central Vietnam. People here are reliant upon non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs), practice swidden and low land agriculture and may fish, do 
logging, work in a sawmill, or run small businesses (CPR Uplands Survey 2009; 
see also Volker and Waibel 2010). Forest-related income is important because 
households can only access small amounts of agricultural land (a maximum of 
2 ha), either through a formal land title process, approval by commune officials, 
or illegal claiming. Households also aspire to plant, as an additional source of 
income, forest crops such as acacia trees that can be harvested after five to seven 
years. For these reasons, many claims to additional agricultural land, trees or 
swidden agricultural plots are made in the informal realm. While some activities 
are sanctioned (fishing in rivers, collecting NTFPs, firewood collection) by lower-
level government units (the commune or district), other activities are prohibited 
and can be risky to do (logging, illegal saw mills, planting acacia in areas without 
land title). Around 6283 ha of natural forest were allocated for community forestry 
across 17 villages within this district between 2005 and 2009 (Table 2). While 
a small amount of this forest area was designated for individual households to 
manage and protect specific forest blocks, the majority of forests (nearly 97%) 
were designated for community forestry. 
5 Community forestry allocation programs are found in four of the eight districts in Hue Province, 
with the highest amount being allocated in A Luoi District (57.6% – other districts range between 
7% and 22%) (Duc et al. 2011). The province plans to expand its community forestry allocation from 
10,000 ha (2010) to over 30,000 ha by 2014.
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In this uplands context, community forestry agreements provide villagers access 
rights to a designated forest area, withdrawal rights to NTFPs (but not hunting or 
most logging activities), management rights (small amounts of land can be turned 
into agricultural or pasture lands, management may include tree thinning, pruning 
or patrolling), and exclusion rights (for those not following community forestry 
regulations or not belonging to the community forestry group). Alienation (selling) 
is not allowed within community forestry areas. Community forests designated to 
villages in this area are around 100 ha, with most forests being of medium to poor 
quality (in terms of forest density and diversity) (Duc et al. 2011). In reality, with 
or without the community forestry designation, villagers mainly use forests that are 
within a few hours walking distance from their homes to access NTFPs, cut small 
amounts of wood for home construction, to graze buffalo or for hunting. In cases 
where villagers go further into the forest, for logging or a specific type of NTFP 
collection, this involves multi-day, over-night trips that not all villagers are willing 
to do. Small amounts of individual land claims may also be found, for agricultural 
activities, within forest areas. Thus, while people do not officially have access to 
much forest, how they use forest areas depends somewhat on how carefully the 
government is monitoring activities and if villagers can get away with certain types 
of practices (i.e. clearing forest areas to plant acacia trees). Community forestry 
advocates argue that villagers need formal rights to forest areas (i.e. withdrawal, 
management, exclusion), since it is not clear how the government might use such 
land in the future (see Figure 1).
Despite this policy focus and the forest access needs of upland communities, the 
uptake of this particular collective right has been slow. In A Loui District, evidence 
from key informant interviews and focus groups point to a series of reasons for this 
situation. First, despite the relative stationarity of forest resources, the bundles of rights 
associated with the community forest agreements do not fit the prevailing economic 
and livelihood aspirations of the majority of individuals. Community forestry imposes 
an increased management burden upon villagers who are often interested in the 
potential to enhance their individual livelihoods through forest-based or agricultural 
activities within community forest areas. Generational differences also factor into 
individual decisions to participate in a collective enterprise. For example, in one case 
youth admitted that they had been hopeful that after the community forestry site was 
allocated, the area could then be allocated to individual households which would 
enable people to plant acacia or other crops. Meanwhile, elders reflected that they 
Table 2: Characteristics of forests allocated for protection, A Loui District
Total area (ha) Type of forest (%) Type of allocation (%)
Production Protection Individual Community
6283.4 1.6 98.4 3.2 96.8
Adapted from: Ngo et al. 2011.
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had previously managed NTFPs and forest areas through agreements between user 
groups whereby individual households all agreed to uses within a particular area (e.g. 
grazing land, resin trees, protecting specific tree species). Their interest in community 
forestry was to find ways of having individual management, as in the past, within a 
collectively managed area. Thus, in many ways the ‘collective’ interest to forest areas 
in these upland sites in Vietnam relates to individual aspirations (Table 3). 
Issues of legitimacy and enforceability were also highlighted by villagers. 
For instance, an obvious constraint to the utility of this particular collective 
rights arrangement has been the distance of the community forestry allocations 
from villages (an average of 1 km, but further in some cases) and their location 
on steep slopes, creating a disincentive and relatively high transaction costs for 
community members to monitor and patrol the forest. In several sites, villagers 
assumed that the forest quality was poor (Ngo et al. 2011). While this is often 
the case (c.f., Sunderlin et al. 2008), participatory forest assessments showed 
that in a few cases forest quality was far richer and diverse than expected. This 
suggests that people have not been adequately involved in site selection of 
community forests, and further highlights distance, access issues (i.e. limited 
walking paths into a dense forest area), and how an active role in managing the 
community forest is not seen as worthwhile. Moreover, community forest areas 
have not been clearly demarcated, and villagers feel that they cannot exclude 
outsiders from using their community forest area since this might create tensions 
with other villages. A few villagers have made individual claims in community 
forestry areas, cutting the natural forest and planting acacia trees. This reflects 
a problem with perceptions about the legitimacy of this particular collective 
rights arrangement. In one community forestry site, 20 ha have been claimed 
by two individuals living in the village in order to plant acacia trees: the total 
community forestry area is only 50.5 ha so this is a significant land claim (Ngo 
et al. 2011). This has led to tensions between villagers with regard to the utility of 
this particular collective rights arrangements, and frustration that the rules of the 
game are not enforced by the community forestry committee. District officials 
have not been interested to get involved in solving these village-level tensions. 
Table 3: Respondents reflection after the allocation of community forestry rights
Respondent Reflection
Villager A We were hoping for individual rights to plant acacia once the forest was allocated.
Villager B Villagers do not follow the rules and it is hard for us to do anything about it.
Villager C It is hard to involve all villagers in forest protection since the forest is far and there 
is little money for us to support this effort.
Commune official It may be worth selling off this area, as the community forest is far from the village 
and hard for people to access.
District official This process works better in some places than others. We need to ensure that people 
can get a benefit from managing their community forest area.
Source: Focus group Dec 2008; Ngo et al. 2011; CPR Workshop May 2011.
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This case is informative since it helps us to consider the role of a collective rights 
allocation within an uplands context. The balance of benefits and responsibilities 
are not right in this case: government officials would like to off-load management 
responsibility to lower levels; villagers argue that it is impossible to patrol and 
exclude outsiders from remote forest areas. While we know that people draw on 
NTFPs, firewood and other forest products (c.f., Uplands survey 2009; McElwee 
2010), this type of rights allocation will require some modification if it is to 
be effective, including local champions to advocate for this type of allocation, 
and strategies to plant and harvest rattan, bamboo or acacia in ways that benefit 
members of a community forest. On the surface, individual claims to forest land 
would appear a better fit for people in the uplands. 
4.2. Case two: state forest re-allocation households
In central Vietnam, community forestry is not the only property rights re-
allocation model to enable household’s greater access to forest and agricultural 
lands. Our second case examines the planned re-allocation of state forest land 
to individual households, the land claiming that ensued because of lack of 
follow through by state authorities, and the resulting institutional uncertainty. 
Within A Loui District the state-run forestry operation – the Forest Protection 
Management Board (FPMB)6 – is in the process of transferring over 5825 
ha (of 33,649 ha) to the district (this takes time since the pine has to be first 
harvested and sold by the FPMB). Once land has been cleared, the idea is 
for district authorities to then have individual communes measure and 
allocate up to 1.5 ha of land for poor households or nearly-poor households 
that lack productive land (Huynh et al. 2011). The transfer of land from the 
FPMB via the district and commune to individual households is expected 
to help households secure their land rights, and address rural poverty and 
environmental protection goals. 
We examine this re-allocation process with specific reference to experiences 
within Phu Thuong village in Phu Vinh7 commune. Within this commune, over 
6  After the end of the Vietnam War, 1975, the government established “State Enterprises” to manage 
forest and forest lands. After forming as a State Enterprise in the late 1970s, pine trees were replanted 
in this area since A. Luoi District was subjected to defoliation campaigns during the war. State Forest 
Enterprises became Forest Protection Management Boards in the late 1990s.
7  Phu Vinh commune consists of four villages, three villages are lowland Vietnamese (Kinh) and 
one is comprised of an ethnic minority group, the Pa Co. Throughout the commune, 60% of house-
holds self-identify as poor (Uplands survey 2009). Livelihood activities are agricultural and resource 
based, with people planting wet rice and cassava, raising animals (including fish, in a few cases) and 
relying on NTFPs from the nearby forests. It appears that minority villagers (the Pa Co) practice 
shifting cultivation (a total of 10,471 m2 / household or home gardening rather than other forms of 
crop cultivation (Uplands survey 2009). Other jobs, mainly available to lowland Vietnamese resi-
dents, include seasonal migration, selling one’s labour, or operating a small home business. Pa Co 
households tend to have limited opportunities, often relying on a small monthly government stipend 
to help make ends meet. Acacia is something people are interested to plant.
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70% of land is classified as forest land, and shifting cultivation does take place in 
forest areas (Uplands survey 2009). Only 2.5% of land is designated for agriculture 
and the rest being designated as non-agricultural land or unused land. Forest lands 
in this context are not available for access or use by local residents, other than 
for seasonally-differentiated NTFP collection or for harvesting small amounts of 
wood for cooking or home construction. Even the land that has been categorized 
as unused (257 ha in this case) has already been claimed (for at least 5 years, 
but often longer), by households that have planted crops or acacia trees (Huynh 
2009) (see Table 4). This overall lack of land to expand agricultural activities or 
to plant tree crops is problematic for people in terms of expanding their livelihood 
base. 
In early 2008, 44 ha (of a total of 591 ha designated for transfer to this 
commune) of pine forest were harvested within the commune. The transfer 
occurred near Phu Thuong village which consists of 96 Pa Co households8. As 
the pine forest plantation area was cleared by the protection forest management 
board, ‘word’ also came down that local households would be granted small 
amounts of land (between 1 and 1.5 ha). However, government officials did not 
immediately follow through on this process. Thus people heard that they may be 
granted rights to land, in the form of private property (see Figure 1), but nothing 
came of this. As such, some households began staking claims to this land within 
the 44 ha harvested area. 
In mid-2008 the 44 ha of cleared pine forest became dotted with evidence of new 
economic activity. Brush had been cleared, small burns could be seen, acacia was 
freshly planted, a few fish ponds had been constructed, and simple living structures 
had been erected. Walking paths could be seen throughout the area. By 2010, 34 
households had claimed all of the 44 ha of cleared land (Ngu et al. 2011). While 
most land was claimed in 2008 and 2009, a few households claimed land earlier 
and a few continued into 2010. An average of 1.1 ha of land was claimed, ranging 
anywhere between a small claim of 0.2 ha and a larger claim of 3 ha. In 13 of the 34 
cases, households claimed small amounts of land in several places. Most households 
8 Phu Thong village has less access to agricultural land than the other three villages found in this 
commune: whereas the average amount of land per household in other villages is 1 ha, in Phu Thuong 
village it is only 0.5 ha (Ngu et al. 2011). 
Table 4: Land-use situation in Phu Vinh commune, A Luoi District, 2009
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planted acacia (31 out of 34 households), in part because the acacia market has 
emerged in the past 5 years. Acacia grows relatively quickly which is why acacia 
is a convenient way to stake a land claim. The remaining three households (of the 
34) have planted either rubber, cinnamon or rice. Twelve of the 34 households have 
intercropped acacia with cassava, pineapple, tea, jackfruit, bamboo or banana (Ngu 
et al. 2011). This is not the only area where villagers have claimed land, as other 
areas of pine forest plantation have also been harvested in this district. 
After several years of individual land claiming, a more collective bargaining 
process emerged in which district and local (commune, village) interests interact. 
District authorities became interested in designing a process that could ensure that 
poorer households are allocated land in an equitable, rather than ad hoc manner, as 
was the case in Phu Thuong village. Using Phu Thuong village as the case model, 
district, commune and village authorities, along with villagers, met multiple 
times in early 2011 to negotiate a process that could acknowledge the existing 
claims to the 44 ha and, at the same time, develop a collective process that could 
be implemented in other areas before land was claimed. After negotiation and 
discussions on management, those households that had claimed land (34 of the 96 
households in this village) were granted temporary use rights from the District until 
the end of 2015. Table 5 highlights respondent reflections on this rights process.
This case is informative for several reasons. The case shows that in the 
absence of a clear transfer process from state to individual rights, problems of 
fit and legitimacy emerge very quickly, even where the resources of interest 
are stationary. In this case it would seem that a stronger allocation mechanism 
would in fact enable the transfer of rights to those in most need, as is the 
policy intent, and that it would also improve the process by which the right 
transfer would be legitimized. In the end, a hybrid arrangement emerged that 
reveals how in this context, individual rights can work, when embedded in 
a process that also supports a collective good. For example, the households 
Table 5: Respondents reflection after the allocation of temporary use rights
Respondent Reflection
Villager A I decided that I had to take the opportunity to claim this land. If I didn’t someone else 
might have and this is one way that I may be able to increase my land ownership.
Villager B I took the risk as I hope that I will at least get a portion of the acacia tree harvest even 
if I do not have any future rights to this land.
Villager C Because the transfer process was not clear, we needed to stabilize the process and 
think about production. We hope the state will continue to work with us and ensure 
that if any household exceeds 1.5 ha as per our new regulations that the extra areas 
will be reallocated to other households to create a fair situation.
Commune official We could not stop the land claiming as we were waiting for the district official.
District official We are really happy with this process – we talked about rights with the commune and 
villagers and decided on appropriate rules. We really had not been sure what to do in 
terms of the land claiming, and hope that we can apply this process to other places. 
Source: Interviews May 2008, 2009, 2010; CPR Final Workshop May 2011.
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will maintain their temporary access, withdrawal and management rights in 
the former pine plantation (44 ha), thus enabling households to harvest their 
acacia trees. In an effort to move forward, however, when it comes time 
to harvest the acacia trees, individual households will retain at least 70% 
of the profit from the harvested trees, will voluntarily contribute 20% of 
their profit into a collective fund which will pay for collective work (e.g. 
protecting acacia trees, infrastructure development such as roads, and other 
costs related to harvesting), and will provide up to 10% of their profits as a 
management fee to the commune authority (i.e. for tree licenses, biomass 
management, general environmental management, and management of the 
acacia harvest). In the meantime, these 34 households have the right to 
exclude other villagers from harvesting their trees. These temporary rights 
cannot, however, be transferred. After 2015 the idea is for these individual 
plots to be re-allocated by the commune (post-acacia harvest) in a process 
that will consider the entire village and the land use needs of all households. 
This is intended to ensure even greater legitimacy and can be adapted to 
the situation at that point in time. As this process unfolds, enforcement by 
commune and district officials will be necessary or there will be a risk that 
further conflict will ensue. 
4.3. Case three: rights allocation to fisheries association in Tam Giang 
lagoon 
The Tam Giang Lagoon is the largest brackish-water lagoon in Southeast Asia, 
covering 22,000 ha and spanning 70 km of Hue’s coastline9. Lagoon physiography 
makes it ideal for capture fishing and aquaculture activities. Property rights are 
complex because of the sheer number of fishing gears people use (approx. 32 
different types, according to Mein 2006), the class of fishing gear people use 
(mobile and fixed), the mix of aquaculture practices and how people move between 
multiple fishing and aquaculture activities, and because the ecological system itself 
is spatially and temporally dynamic. People use stake traps, bottom nets, gill nets, 
and practice various forms of aquaculture (net enclosure, earth ponds; single and 
9 Around 300,000 people, representing one third of the provincial population, live in the 33 mu-
nicipalities surrounding the lagoon, with an estimated 100,000 people depending directly on small-
scale capture fisheries and small-producer aquaculture and another 200,000 people depending on a 
range of related livelihood activities including coastal agriculture and occasional fishing or fishing-
related activities (Tuyen et al. 2010). Main fishing and fish farming activities include fish corals 
(21%), net enclosure (17%), earth pond aquaculture (14%), gill nets (9%) and bottom net stake 
trap (9%); main non-fishing activities includes rice culture (18%) for those who have access to 
rice fields (Lagoon survey 2009). From an ecological point of view, the lagoon is rich in aquatic 
life, with over 233 fish species (Thanh et al. 2007). The mix in salinity, due to seasonality and 
spatial variation, accounts for the wide range of species. Main species include: a variety of shrimp 
(Penaeus monodon, Penaeus semisulcatus, Metapenaeus ensis), crab (Scylla serrata, Portunus 
pelagicus, Portunus sanguinolentus) and fish (Siganus spp., Gerres filamentosus, Glossogobius 
giuris, Therapon theraps).
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mixed species)10. Mobile gear fishing continues to function, more or less, as an 
open access or ‘first come first serve’ activity. Fixed gear fishing gear began as an 
open access activity that, over time, has led to de facto titles or permits (stake traps 
are an example of fixed fishing gear with de facto rights). There are also land use 
titles granted for 20-year periods from the district level, mainly for aquaculture 
earth ponds near the village, plus permits granted for 5-year periods for some 
aquaculture earth ponds at the edge of the lagoon, and 1-year commune permits/
registration for fish corrals, converted net enclosures and a few earth ponds (Ta 
2010). Given this mix of formal and informal use rights, multiple resource users 
are competing for the same space. Those households that have start-up capital and 
access to land are able to do aquaculture, whereas those that do not have start-up 
capital or access to land for ponds generally draw on forms of mobile fishing gear 
(gill nets and, more recently, bottom steel-frame nets).
The lagoon is too densely used, and provincial government staff are too far 
removed to adequately monitor and regulate this situation. This lagoon is an 
ecosystem in transition – capture fisheries are at near collapse and no fisher is 
particularly optimistic about their future (Armitage et al. 2011). While villagers 
have been discussing declines of capture fisheries in the past few years (34% of 
fishers observe that fish species diversity has decreased a lot since 1999; 64% 
of fishers suggest that there has been a significant decrease in the total species 
caught since 1999), in 2011 fishers reported only catching very small species 
of fish and shrimp. Aquaculture as an effective alternative to capture fisheries 
is risky. Disease was already reported in the early 2000s, especially in semi-
intensive shrimp culture. By 2006 people began switching to mixed species and 
extensive shrimp culture in an effort to deal with disease outbreaks. In this context 
of increased resource pressure and conflict among fixed and mobile gear fishers, 
efforts to reconcile and (re)allocate rights depends on a careful reading of what is 
a decidedly complex and dynamic property rights setting. 
A solution to such complexity is to allocate a collective spatial or territorial 
use rights for fishing11 and aquaculture activities to a legally constituted social 
10 Aquaculture yields the highest total benefit to local people, followed by capture fisheries, agricul-
ture production and sea-grass production (Tuan et al. 2009). Yet, when examining total net benefit, 
capture fisheries has historically had the highest production since it is less risky than aquaculture and 
has lower production costs compared to both aquaculture and farming (Tuan et al. 2009). This may 
be changing, as fishers report being no longer able to catch crabs (2011) and particularly efficient 
mobile gear (steel net traps) was introduced into the lagoon in 2006 with negative ecological con-
sequences. In 2009 fishers felt that a mix of fishing and fish farming were important for the future, 
with fish corals (20%) being seen as the most important activity in the future, followed by earth pond 
aquaculture (15%) and net enclosure (14%). However, people also talked about the importance of 
rice culture in the future (16%), followed by being a business person (5%), doing animal husbandry 
(3%), being a government worker (3%) and being a labourer (2%).
11 This process is often referred to as community fisheries within the Southeast Asian region (c.f., 
Pomeroy et al. 2008), although it is more often than not a co-management process with some form 
of state-village partnership that is promoted. For more details on TURFs in other regions, it is worth 
examining the experiences from Chile (c.f. Gelcich et al. 2010; Gallardo et al. 2011). 
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organization (i.e. a fishing association unit) at the village or commune level. 
User groups are allowed to form socio-professional organizations (in accordance 
with the 2008 Law on Social Organization and Association, updated in 2010). 
In the Tam Giang lagoon, a network of Fishing Associations have emerged that 
are recognized by higher level authorities as having an important role to play in 
managing aquatic resources in the lagoon. There are now 50 Fishing Associations 
established at the village or sub-commune level with over 4500 members across the 
lagoon. For individual Fishing Associations to be granted formal fishing ‘rights’ 
over the lagoon, 75% of a village needs to belong to the fishing association and 
they need to show the District government their plans for fisheries management. 
In 2009, the first ever (in Vietnam, to the best of our knowledge) territorial use 
right for fisheries (TURF) allocation of 967 ha was allocated to the Vinh Giang 
Fishing Association12. What is innovative in this case is that Fisheries Associations 
are given rights to fisheries and aquaculture activities within a designated area, 
and this right is allocated to a village organization rather than the village council 
in general. The TURF includes sub-zoning of lagoon surface area for different 
functions or purposes. Specific modifications in fishing activity are required as 
part of the collective rights allocation (access, withdrawal, management, see 
Figure 1), including a reduction in the number of stake trap units, restrictions on 
certain gear types (electric fishing), improved protection of breeding areas and 
seaweed beds, and appropriate aquaculture intensity by introducing mix-species 
culture techniques. In Vinh Giang, for example, the Fishing Association was able 
to reduce the number of stake traps from 89 to 56. Since this initial allocation, 
another six rights allocation have been granted to six Fishing Associations around 
the lagoon13. This rights allocation has made the difference of people using the 
lagoon in an ad hoc manner in comparison to people using the lagoon in a more 
managed manner.
12 In May 2009, 978 ha were designated for management from the district to the fishing association 
of Vinh Giang commune. The management plan for the TURF was developed by the fishery associa-
tion (with facilitation support by university researchers), and includes the zoning of lagoon surface 
areas into different functional units with different purposes (Armitage et al. 2011). Zoning serves as 
a foundation for the development of regulations and the organization of self-managed groups aligned 
to specific resource use activities. Thus, the lagoon space in Vinh Giang has been divided into differ-
ent sub-zones, including those for fixed gear fishing, waterway combined with mobile gear fishing, 
traffic areas, breeding areas and seasonally protected zones. Zoning is based on local experiences 
and knowledge of lagoon resources and on the current uses of the lagoon, but is consistent with 
Provincial and District plans for fishery exploitation. Key changes in fishing activity as required by 
the TURF include a decline in the number of fish corral units, restrictions on certain gear types (steel 
net traps), improved protection of breeding areas and seaweed beds, and introducing semi-intensive, 
mix-species aquaculture techniques. 
13 Two of these rights allocations were facilitated by the project research team: 187 ha in Phu My in 
2010 (main activities are fish corral and net enclosure) and 242 ha to another fisheries association in 
2011 (main activities are fish corral, dai, gill nets and steel net stake traps). This latter allocation was 
tricky in that boundaries had to be agreed between two districts. 
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The collective rights allocation has emerged as one way to deal with the 
unplanned expansion of lagoon activities, in and around a village, to enable a 
detailed plan to control fishery exploitation and, at the same time, to maintain 
household livelihoods. In short, the rights allocation aims for a good fit with 
current conditions and local context because it matches the spatial scale of activity 
with the appropriate jurisdictional level. Fishing Associations not only manage the 
capture fisheries area, they are also responsible for household-based aquaculture 
activities in their community-designated area. The rights allocation thus provides a 
legitimate mechanism from the perspective of community members and officials to 
ensure access and withdrawal rights for Fishing Association members. Moreover, 
the collective rights allocation contains a significant focus on management, 
including the monitoring and patrolling functions that enable enforceability of the 
right. While Fishing Associations cannot control for all illegal activities, they can 
increase patrolling to avoid the theft of fish or prevent electric fishing, implement 
consistent stocking regimes in an area, and designate areas for protection or for 
seaweed production which can provide a form of income to support committee 
work (Armitage et al. 2011). See Table 6 for selected perspectives on the allocation 
of fishing rights.
This particular collective rights allocation reflects fit, legitimacy and 
enforceability in several additional ways. For instance, people move between forms 
of fishing and aquaculture (Tuyen et al. 2010), and property rights are overlapping 
and often contested. The collective rights designation, therefore, serves to give 
village level actors greater control over decision-making. At the same time, the 
collective right provides individual net enclosure and fish corral owners (forms of 
aquaculture) with greater individual security over use rights. The collective right 
also offers a mechanism to secure local interests against outside business interests 
or migrants coming into the area in search of resources that may shift through 
Table 6: Respondents reflection after the allocation of fishing rights
Respondent Reflection
Villager A We are now able to better manage things, including controlling electric fishing 
and other destructive fishing in our fishing grounds, solving some conflicts, and 
discussing how to deal with issues.
Villager B The rights allocation helps us to stabilize our capture fishing and aquaculture so as 
to stabilize our livelihoods. It helps improve the fishery production with balancing 
capture fishing, aquaculture and resource conservation.
Villager C The commune now asks our opinion about managing lagoon resources.
Commune official We do not have the time or the budget to always think about fishing or aquaculture in 
the lagoon, so it makes sense for village groups to focus more on this.
District official This is a far more effective way to manage the lagoon as the village groups can work 
with us. 
Source: Focus group April 2007; May 2009, CPR Workshop May 2011.
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time and space. The fishing right allocation does not prevent users who are non-
fishing Association members from having access to waterways, but they do need 
to follow the management regulations. Longer-term, however, it is not clear if this 
collective rights allocation will contribute to poverty alleviation, particularly if 
fisheries declines continue. Whether Fishing Associations can mitigate or dampen 
the effects of severe stock declines or disease outbreaks in aquaculture ponds 
with their monitoring and management techniques is also an open question. This 
is an ecosystem in transition, and this collective right makes sense at least for the 
short-term. 
5. Discussion and conclusion
In Vietnam, as elsewhere, individual and collective rights can be formal or 
informal (unwritten or codified). As a result, de facto rights that govern the day 
to day use of natural resources are often different from de jure rights that exist in 
formal legal documents (Mascia and Claus 2009). Actors may derive benefits from 
resources without holding property rights to them, such as deriving benefits from 
an agricultural field by way of occupation or market exchange even though they 
do not have any formal property rights (Ribot and Peluso 2003). In practice, the 
contextual diversity and variation in bundles of rights make property rights policy 
a challenge, leading to oversimplifications of appropriate strategies, or unintended 
consequences associated with implementation of natural resource management 
projects (Tanner 2007). It is important to understand everyday land and resource 
use practices in combination with formal policies; it is also worth recognizing the 
incentive structures for both individual and collective rights particularly from the 
perspective of local users who may need a mix of rights to secure and sustain their 
livelihoods. 
As our cases show, formal and informal rights form a continuum. Within such 
formal and informal rights, farmer and fisher agency through various (individual) 
claims and government responses to them (condoning, tolerating or actively 
supporting) play a key role in negotiating how mixtures of overlapping rights 
work in practice. The three cases examined here illustrate how efforts to resolve 
the challenges of rural poverty and environmental protection involve complex and 
dynamic property rights and linked resource-based livelihood activities. Support 
to existing collective rights is one strategy to address rural livelihood challenges, 
as are efforts to implement new collective rights arrangements. Potentially useful 
policy responses to the challenges of rural poverty have emerged in Vietnam, 
including our three cases of community forestry, the re-allocation of state land to 
individual households, and territorial use rights for fisheries. 
Each of our cases represents different social and ecological situations, 
demonstrating the need for flexible governance arrangements beyond discrete 
property regimes (c.f., German and Keeler 2010). In the case of the state forest 
land re-allocation, this is an example of the individualization of forest land for 
conversion into agriculture and short-cycle agro-forestry such as acacia. The 
Do collective property rights make sense? Insights from central Vietnam 21
former pine plantation areas are no longer seen as forests: this is accepted by 
all parties involved, including the government. This is in stark contrast to our 
community forestry case where the starting point is that forest integrity needs 
to be maintained. Forest conservation is an important component of community 
forestry policy; this links to the lagoon rights allocation case in that conservation (or 
preventing further degradation or exploitation of the lagoon) is also an overriding 
concern. The title of our paper asks “Do collective rights make sense”, and what 
we show is that there are no collective rights arrangements in a ‘pure’ sense, but 
rather a series of arrangements that, when working, foster collaborative action and 
strengthen resource conservation. This is taking place in a context where there is 
strong pressure for individualization. For these reasons, a mix of individual and 
collective rights is important for people who use natural resources in multiple 
ways, and move back and forth between spaces, ecosystems and administrative 
boundaries. 
Whether collective rights will work in practice depends upon the extent to which 
they fit the context (e.g. social, economic, ecological), are considered legitimate, and 
are enforceable. As these three cases illustrate, policy uptake has not been consistent 
across these examples and getting the right fit is not so easy. It is one thing to have 
a policy; it is another thing to ensure such rights go from a blueprint approach to 
being contextually adapted. Most centrally, the three cases show how difficult it 
is to determine if collective rights make sense when individuals have a desire to 
increase their access to land in unambiguous ways. At a minimum there needs to 
be sensitivity to variation within collective rights arrangements, recognizing the 
variety of interests that people may have in any rights transfer process (Table 7).
As our three cases each demonstrate, the benefit of collective rights has to 
be such that there is a perceived collective and individual benefit. Only at this 
Table 7: Reflections on fit, legitimacy and enforceability
Rights allocation Fit Legitimacy of rights Enforceability of rights
Community  
forestry 
(State to village, 
forestry)
No. The incentive and 
benefit-sharing  
structure needs to be 
re-worked
Yes/No, forestry 
department supports  
the process but is not 
active in area; not as 
meaningful in eyes of 
constituents
No – too far from 
village to patrol and 
benefit of such an  




(State to  
household via a  
set territory)
Somewhat. Provides 
benefits to multiple 
users, with clarity of 
process. Others are 
excluded, for now
Yes, legitimizes rights  
for those that were 
initially brave enough  
to claim land
Maybe – likely possible 
at a local level given 
the multiple individual 
interests





Yes, mixes individual 
and collective rights  
for fisheries
Yes, accepted formally 
and informally by 
multiple users who  
shift between mobile  
and fixed gear fishing
Mostly – collaborative 
action that regulates 
individual practices
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point is there a chance that the right will be enforced, whether through peer 
pressure, formal patrols or outside support. For instance, a major challenge with 
community forestry allocation appears to be getting the right fit: the balance 
between benefits and responsibilities is off, and villagers are not able to enforce 
their rights. There is an additional dimension here: when we talk about collective 
rights we are talking as well about the need for collaboration or collective action. 
The government is concerned about resource preservation for which collective 
action is needed (agreement and legitimization of rules in use, implementing such 
rules, etc.) whereas farmers are more interested in direct benefits, which they see 
in agriculture or agro-forestry on individual plots. Since farmers can informally 
access forest areas in and around their villages, the burden of patrolling and 
enforcement is not seen as worthwhile at this point in time. Perhaps community 
forestry is something that might make sense at a future point, when there are 
less forest areas in general, or when trees can be harvested in certain parts of a 
community forestry area. This type of collective right needs to match people’s 
aspirations and the effort they are willing to put into the management of natural 
resources. 
Re-allocating state forest areas to individual households did not unfold as 
authorities envisioned. The district was not able to intervene with a coherent 
process in a timely manner, leaving a window in which people could claim the 
cleared pine forest plantation land. The ensuing land grab speaks to people’s need 
for more land and the belief that one way to legitimize a claim is to be active on 
the landscape – this is reflected by the fact that 34 households sought to claim 
land. Those that claimed the cleared land took a risk, as it was unclear how this 
process might unfold (although there is a history in this area of district officials 
ignoring some local claims). The livelihood activities in the cleared pine forest 
land have two sides: the ‘utility’ of actual land use (growing trees, raising fish) 
and the political act of staking a claim. This has paid off, since these households 
now have individual (although temporary) use rights to this land and much of the 
proceeds of acacia harvest until the end of 2015. The commune also derives a 
benefit from this process in the form of a tax on harvested trees. The government 
is probably often hard put to intervene when farmers who are really short of land 
open up forest (or, for that matter, in the lagoon when really poor people engage 
in destructive fishing activities). There seems to be a moral argument that people 
have the right to livelihoods (and thus resources) that makes it hard to intervene 
strongly.
For these reasons, the forest land re-allocation appears to be a situation 
whereby the temporary lease rights are enforceable, legitimate (in part because 
those who took a risk could claim land) and contextually adapted. What is 
less clear is who did not dare to claim land, and how one would negotiate this 
process in another area to ensure poorer households (i.e. not those with labor 
or connections) could gain access to land. Ultimately, this process will lead to 
individual rights. Yet, the case is revealing because it was through a collective 
process that these individual rights have been clarified. This process prevented a 
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potentially high-conflict situation from emerging, and it likely reflects a better fit 
with the norms and aspirations of an upland Pa Co dominated village. 
In the lagoon case, the TURF may be an appropriate rights allocation because 
use rights are over-lapping and complicated. Fishing Association members 
indicate that the rights allocation is an opportunity for officials with limited 
resources to share the burden of management, thus reducing their transaction 
costs with communities and potentially ensuring a better success rate around 
contentious issues (this is also the case with community forestry, although here 
it is more difficult to get past policy and into practice). Fishing Association 
members are also clear about the incentives they see embodied in the collective 
rights allocation. Central among these incentives is: 1) the opportunity to 
more directly self-manage lagoon resources within their allocated territory; 
2) expectations about stabilizing environmental conditions in the lagoon; 3) a 
more proactive approach to solving technical problems (e.g. stocking density); 
4) more effective patrolling and increased collective effort to patrol fishing areas 
and prevent the expansion of destructive fishing practices (e.g. electric fishing); 
and 5) a reduction in conflict among fixed and mobile gear fishing activities 
(Armitage et al. 2011). Certain rights are enforceable, it is legitimate since 75% 
of a village needs to belong to a Fishing Association for a territorial use right to 
be granted, and this appears to be adapted to the local context. Most centrally, 
however, peoples’ interest in collective rights to a spatially defined area of the 
lagoon is high because it creates an opportunity to secure individual aquaculture 
rights. Several fishing association members suggested that as capture fisheries 
decline, aquaculture will continue to be an important livelihood activity. Thus, 
there is the guarantee of sustaining individual benefits within this collective 
rights gain.
Evidence in each of these three cases suggests that individual rights are 
paramount to households. Yet, it also appears that a sole focus on individual rights 
makes less sense where complexity is particularly high or where the process of 
re-allocation or transfer is not recognized as legitimate. Thus, there are important 
policy insights that can be derived from these three cases (Table 8). There is a 
need for collaborative action and agreed rules in a context of weak government 
capacity to ensure conservation and an overlapping context of government policy 
promoting the decentralization of rights. Thus, there is a role for collective rights, 
if adapted to fit a local context and resource reality. Resource rights need to 
ensure that people will get enough benefit to be involved in the management of 
a resource. The limited ability to harvest trees is an issue for community forestry 
designation and this is in stark contrast to the collective rights for fisheries or 
aquaculture that enable harvesting of aquatic products. The cases remind us of the 
complexity found on the ground, and the inherent difficulty of clarifying bundles 
of rights to resources that different users may have at different times. Ultimately, 
enforceability, fit and legitimacy will determine if and how collective rights make 
sense, and provide a filter with which to analyze and read a rights situation within 
complex social-ecological systems. 
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Table 8: Key policy insights
Insight Example
The line between collective and  
individual rights is often blurred in  
practice
Individuals can come together to manage an area;  
those with collective rights may also opt for  
individual rights within a collective rights setting as  
in the lagoon case; collective processes can be used  
to allocate individual rights in ways that fit the  
context as in the upland state forest reallocation case
Collective rights make sense when they  
are: (i) designed to fit context; (ii)  
provide users with access to resources  
they perceive as valuable; and (iii) they  
create space to enhance individual  
security (either of tenure or in terms of  
resource access) 
The TURF allocation is a collective right that  
addresses fishing, aquaculture, conservation and  
economic development activities simultaneously; the  
TURF balances collective and individual aspirations 
Achieving ‘fit’ and legitimacy takes time;  
Collective, individual and hybrid  
arrangements are likely to emerge  
through trial and error requiring  
flexibility and learning from different  
groups 
Property rights in many (most) situations  
are complex and are emergent; a  
tendency of outsiders (policy-makers,  
researchers) to understand these  
arrangements ‘too quickly’ (sensu Tanner  
2007) constrains opportunity for  
successful policy design and uptake
Community forestry policy is innovative, but it is  
difficult to get policy uptake (by officials and  
villagers) in this area, reflecting a need to adjust the  
current approach
In the lagoon example, rights allocation has emerged  
in the context of a co-management process that has  
evolved over a decade or more, and has slowly built  
trust among various groups
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